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The paper sets out a primitive ontology of the natural world in terms of primitive
stuff, that is, stuff that has as such no physical properties at all, but that is not
a bare substratum either, being individuated by metrical relations. We focus on
quantum physics and employ identity-based Bohmian mechanics to illustrate this
view, but point out that it applies all over physics. Properties then enter into the
picture exclusively through the role that they play for the dynamics of the primitive
stuff. We show that such properties can be local (classical mechanics), as well as
holistic (quantum mechanics), and discuss two metaphysical options to conceive
them, namely Humeanism and modal realism in the guise of dispositionalism.
Keywords: primitive ontology, primitive stuff, ontic structural realism, identical
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1 Introduction
There are two main options pursued in current research on the ontology of quantum
physics. One option is to take the formalism of the quantum theory that one adopts
to refer to the quantum state, represented by the universal wave-function, that is, the
wave-function of the whole universe. Consequently, the quantum state is the physical
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object of the formalism of quantum physics. This option is pursued in the quantum
theory going back to Everett (1957) (see also Albert 1996 and the papers in Saunders
et al. 2010 and Albert and Ney 2013 for discussion). However, since the quantum state is
defined on a very high-dimensional space, namely the configuration space of the universe,
this option implies that one is committed to that very high-dimensional space being the
space in which the fundamental physical reality is situated.
If one shrinks back from that consequence and maintains that quantum physics is
about matter existing in three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time, one
is committed to what is known as a primitive ontology as regards that matter. The
role of the quantum state, represented by the universal wave-function, then is limited
to the dynamics, that is, its role is to guide or govern the temporal development of the
distribution of matter in physical space (see Allori et al. 2008). In brief, the motivation
for the primitive ontology option is to uphold the commitment to physics being about
matter in ordinary space also when it comes to quantum physics, although the quantum
state is defined on a very high-dimensional space (see e.g. Monton 2006, Maudlin 2010,
Belot 2012).
It is obvious that a dualism consisting in a conjunction of these two options is not
an attractive position: if one takes the quantum state as represented by the universal
wave-function to be the physical object of quantum physics, then that state as it exists in
the very high-dimensional space on which the universal wave-function is defined, is the
physical reality. There then is no point to take that state to be also the state of matter
distributed in three-dimensional space. The task rather is to show how the dynamics of
the quantum state existing in the configuration space of the universe can be such that
this state develops in that space – e.g. through decoherence – into something that can
account for our experience of matter being distributed in a three-dimensional space.
By the same token, if one commits oneself to a primitive ontology of matter distributed
in three-dimensional space being the referent of the formalism of quantum physics, then
there is no point in adding to that commitment a commitment to the quantum state
existing in the high-dimensional configuration space of the universe. The reason is, in
brief, that it is not intelligible how the quantum state could fulfill the role that it has in
the primitive ontology theories of quantum physics, namely to guide the temporal devel-
opment of the primitive ontology, if it were a physical object on a par with the primitive
ontology, but existing in another space; it would, for instance, be unclear how a field
existing in the very high-dimensional configuration space of the universe, represented
by the universal wave-function, could guide the motion of matter in three-dimensional
space. Since the quantum state enters the primitive ontology theories through the role
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that it plays for the temporal development of the primitive ontology, it is reasonable to
regard it as nomological, by contrast to a physical entity on a par with the primitive
ontology (cf. Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì 2013, chs. 11.5 and 12). We will consider in
sections 4 and 5 two proposals to spell out what it means that the quantum state is
nomological, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism.
This paper is concerned with the second option. Its aim is to push the idea of a
primitive ontology of quantum physics to its ultimate consequence and to show that
the primitive ontology option applies throughout physics. The ultimate consequence is
to maintain that matter is primitive stuff, materia prima, having as such no physical
properties at all. What is usually regarded as physical properties enters into the theory
through its role for the dynamics of the primitive stuff, that is, through its nomological
role. In other words, the way in which the primitive ontology theories of quantum physics
are often presented, namely in terms of introducing the elements of the primitive ontology
as being characterized by classical properties such as mass and charge, is incoherent, as
is the dualism of a primitive ontology existing in three-dimensional space and a quantum
state existing in configuration space. The reason for this incoherence is that the dynamics
of classical physics is fundamentally different: in classical physics, dynamical variables
such as mass and charge are attributed to point particles taken individually. Given the
laws of classical physics, the distribution of mass and charge in the universe fixes how
the particles move.
In quantum physics, by contrast, it is in general not possible to attribute a wave-
function to the particles taken individually, but in the last resort only to the whole con-
figuration of matter in the universe at a given time. In the primitive ontology theories
of quantum physics, the wave-function then has the job to fix the temporal development
of the configuration of matter (in a deterministic or probabilistic manner). It is inco-
herent to assume that the determination of the dynamics encoded in the wave-function
is superimposed on a determination of the dynamics through the classical properties of
the particles taken individually, that is, their mass and their charge. In brief, either the
dynamics is determined from above so to speak, namely by variables that apply only to
the primitive ontology as a whole, or the dynamics is determined from below, namely by
variables belonging to the elements of the primitive ontology taken individually. Since
the latter option is excluded for quantum physics, it is reasonable to pursue the former
one. This implies taking the primitive ontology to be primitive stuff, instead of particles
that are equipped with intrinsic properties each, and conceiving the dynamics as being
determined by variables belonging to the whole configuration of the primitive stuff.
In the next two sections, we first elaborate on the metaphysics and then on the physics
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of matter as primitive stuff, using the formalism of Bohmian mechanics for identical
particles. In section 4, we show how a recent proposal for a Humean conception of the
dynamical variables can shed light on this view of matter. In section 5, we apply this
proposal to the more ambitious metaphysical stance according to which the dynamical
variables literally determine the temporal development of an initial configuration of
primitive stuff.
2 Primitive Ontology: Primitive Stuff
The term primitive ontology goes back to Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì (2013, ch. 2, see
end of section 2.2, paper originally published 1992). They write:
What we regard as the obvious choice of primitive ontology—the basic kinds of
entities that are to be the building blocks of everything else (except, of course, the
wave function)—should by now be clear: Particles, described by their positions in
space, changing with time—some of which, owing to the dynamical laws governing
their evolution, perhaps combine to form the familiar macroscopic objects of daily
experience. (Quoted from the reprint in Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì 2013, p. 29; a
forerunner of this notion can be found in Mundy 1989, p. 46)
This term has been created in the context of quantum mechanics in order to remind
us of the fact that the formalism of quantum mechanics is supposed to represent some-
thing, namely matter in space, and is supposed to describe its behavior, for instance in
measurement situations. The first sense in which the ontology of matter distributed in
physical space is primitive is that this ontology cannot be inferred from the formalism
of textbook quantum mechanics, but has to be put in as the referent of that formalism.
According to the proposal pursued in this paper, that ontology is furthermore primitive
in the sense that it consists in primitive stuff, that is, stuff that has as such no physical
properties. Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì allude to this meaning of “primitive” in the
quotation above when they say that the particles are described only by their position in
space. That is to say, a particle being located at a point of space merely signifies that
the point in question is occupied instead of being empty. But as far as the primitive
ontology is concerned, there are no physical properties – such as a mass or a charge –
instantiated by the particle.
The de Broglie-Bohm theory, going back to de Broglie (1928) and Bohm (1952) and
known today as Bohmian mechanics (see Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì 2013) is the oldest
primitive ontology theory of quantum mechanics. Bohmian mechanics puts forward a
discrete primitive ontology of point particles, whereby, as mentioned above, a particle
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being located at a point of three-dimensional space means that the point in question
is occupied by primitive stuff instead of being empty. What accounts for the primitive
stuff occupying points being particles is that, according to Bohmian mechanics, there
are continuous lines of occupation of points in space-time, so that there are worldlines
constituting particle trajectories. In Bohmian mechanics, the role of the wave-function,
developing according to the Schrödinger equation, is to determine, via what is known as
the guiding equation, the velocity of each particle at any time t given the position of all
the particles at t. We will go into the physics of Bohmian mechanics in the next section.
For present purposes, it is only important to note that velocity is not a property that
the particles have over and above being located in space, but simply the first temporal
derivative of position.
The view according to which all the physical properties, including mass and charge, are
best understood at the level of the wave-function rather than at the level of the Bohmian
particles has been suggested in the literature on the basis of experimental considerations
involving interference phenomena, for instance in the context of the Aharonov-Bohm
effect and of certain interferometry experiments (see e.g. Brown et al. 1995 and ref-
erences therein; cf. also most recently Pylkkänen et al. 2014). Brown et al. (1996)
explicitly discuss this view – which they call the parsimonious view –, but only within
the framework of a dualistic ontology that recognizes both the Bohminan particles and
the wave-function as genuine ontological entities on their own right. However, as we have
argued above in section 1, there is no point in doing so; in particular, it remains entirely
mysterious how the wave-function understood as a physical object on configuration space
could guide the Bohmian particles. Indeed Brown et al. (1996, § 4) acknowledge this
fact when they concede that their parsimonious view faces what they call the problem of
recognition, namely to explain how the wave-function of a given particle “knows” which
particle to guide when there are several particle species in a region of overlap of the
respective wave-functions, assuming a factorizable total wave-function for simplicity.
Furthermore, there are two primitive ontology theories of quantum mechanics using
the dynamics proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (GRW) (1986), which seeks to
include the textbooks’ postulate of the collapse of the wave-function upon measurement
into a modified Schrödinger equation. Bell (1987, ch. 22) suggests that whenever there is
a spontaneous localization of the wave-function in configuration space, this development
of the wave-function in configuration space represents an event occurring at a point in
physical space. These point-events are today known as flashes; that term was introduced
by Tumulka (2006, p. 826). According to the GRW flash theory (GRWf), the flashes
are all there is in space-time. As far as the primitive ontology is concerned, the GRW
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flash theory is the Bohmian particle ontology without the trajectories: instead of particle
trajectories – that is, continuous lines of occupation of points in space-time –, there are
only isolated points being occupied by primitive stuff.
Bohmian mechanics and the GRW flash theory both propose a primitive ontology of
primitive stuff that is discrete: particles or flash-events at space-time points. By contrast,
Ghirardi, Grassi, and Benatti (1995) develop an ontology of a continuous matter density
distribution in physical space (GRWm). The wave-function in configuration space and
its temporal development as described by the GRW equation represent at any time
the density of matter in physical space, and the spontaneous localization of the wave-
function in configuration space (its “collapse”) represents a spontaneous contraction of
the matter density in physical space, thus accounting for measurement outcomes and
well localized macrophysical objects in general (see also Monton 2004). Again, matter
is primitive stuff, as pointed out by Allori et al. (2014):
Moreover, the matter that we postulate in GRWm and whose density is given by
the m function does not ipso facto have any such properties as mass or charge; it
can only assume various levels of density. (Allori et al. 2014, pp. 331–332)
Matter thus is gunk, filling all of space. This, however, implies that the primitive stuff
admits of degrees, as expressed by them function in the GRWm formalism: there is more
stuff at some points of space than at others, with the density of matter at the points
of space changing in time; otherwise, the theory would not be able to accommodate
variation. But it remains unclear what could constitute the difference in degrees of
stuff at points of space, if matter just is primitive stuff. The GRWm theory hence is
committed to the view of matter being a bare substratum with its being a primitive
fact that this substratum has various degrees of density at points of space or space-
time. In other words, there is a primitive stuff-essence of matter that admits different
degrees of density. On Bohmian mechanics and the GRW flash ontology, by contrast, the
only variation consists in some points of space being occupied while others are empty,
with there being a change in time in which points of space are occupied. This ontology
can then easily account for the concentration of matter in certain regions of space by
maintaining that in some regions of space, more points are occupied than in other regions
of space.
Nonetheless, Bohmian mechanics and the GRW flash theory face the following ques-
tion: What is it that occupies points of space? In other words: What accounts for
the difference between a point of space being occupied and its being empty? There are
no intrinsic properties such as mass or charge available that could make up for that
difference. That is to say, Bohmian particles or GRW flashes do not have an intrinsic
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essence constituted by intrinsic properties. Even if there are no intrinsic properties, one
could still maintain that Bohmian particles or GRW flashes have a primitive thisness
(haecceity). However, haecceitism is a very controversial metaphysical stance. In any
case, it is a purely metaphysical view that is always available if one is willing to pay the
price, physics be as it may. In other words, there is no motivation for haecceitism from
physics (especially given the explicit and generalized permutation invariance that we will
explain below in section 3). It seems hence that also in the case of a primitive ontology
of discrete objects (particles, flashes), we have to fall back into admitting a primitive
stuff-essence of matter that accounts for the difference between a point of space being
empty and its being occupied. The only difference between a primitive ontology of dis-
crete objects and a primitive ontology of gunk would then be that in the latter case
that primitive stuff-essence also has to include different degrees of density at points of
space. In a nutshell, it seems that the primitive ontology theories of quantum physics
are committed to conceiving matter as a Lockean bare substratum.1
This consequence puts these theories in an uncomfortable position: the commitment to
a bare substratum is a controversial metaphysical stance. One may motivate this stance
by claiming that there has to be a primitive stuff-essence at the bedrock of matter. But
one can also with reason object that a primitive stuff-essence in the guise of a bare
substratum is mysterious. In any case, again, the view that there is a primitive ontology
of physics is well-motivated – since physics, including quantum physics, can with good
reason be taken to be about matter in space-time –, but there is no motivation from
physics to conceive the primitive ontology in terms of a primitive stuff-essence of matter
(cf. the objection that Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 136 note 15, raise against Bohmian
particles). The upshot of these considerations hence is that if one admits an essence of
matter, that essence be better constituted by properties – or relations, as we shall argue
–, but never be primitive.
The impasse into which the question of what accounts for the difference between a
point of space being occupied and its being empty runs is a consequence of conceiving
the primitive ontology theories in terms of a commitment to absolute space into which
matter is inserted. Only in the case of a dualism of there being points of space and
matter occupying these points does that question arise. However, whereas working
with an absolute background space certainly is an elegant manner of presenting these
theories (at least as long as the issue of including gravity is left out), there is no reason
why the primitive ontology theories should be commitment to a dualism of matter and
space. In other words, speaking in terms of points of space being occupied or empty
1We are grateful to one of the referees for raising this objection.
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just is a convenient manner of setting out the view of matter as primitive stuff, but
should not be taken literally. If we conceive the primitive ontology in terms of discrete
objects (particles, flashes), we can formulate its core claim in the following manner:
matter is primitive stuff. It is discrete, consisting in matter points. These are matter
points, because there is a non-vanishing three-dimensional distance between any two such
points. In other words, they are matter points in virtue of being connected by metrical
relations. In that way, switching from absolutism to relationalism about space removes
the commitment to a bare substratum or a primitive stuff-essence because it opens up
the possibility to conceive the primitive stuff in terms of standing in metrical relations
that are its essence.
A primitive ontology theory that treats matter as primitive stuff, but seeks to avoid
a commitment to a primitive stuff-essence or bare substratum cannot but adopt the
Cartesian characterization of matter in terms of spatial extension. In a nutshell, what
distinguishes points of a primitive matter stuff from points of a hypothetical primitive
mental stuff only is that the former, by contrast to the latter, are connected by metrical
relations. Nonetheless, there are no space-time points. There are substances that are
not extended in themselves (points). These are material, because they are connected by
spatial relations and move, so that there is change in their spatial relations and thus a
temporal development of the spatial configuration of these point-substances. If they were
not connected by spatial relations, but by hypothetical fundamental mental relations,
they would not be primitive matter stuff (matter points) and not be physical entities,
but primitive mental stuff.
Hence, what makes it that a point is a matter point is nothing intrinsic of that point
– no intrinsic properties, no primitive thisness, no bare substratum or primitive stuff-
essence –, but the fact that it stands in spatial relations. The view of matter as primitive
stuff thereby joins the stance known as (moderate) ontic structural realism in claiming
that the identity of the fundamental physical objects, namely the matter points in this
case, is provided by certain relations, namely metrical relations (see Esfeld and Lam
2008). Nonetheless, these relations are strong enough to allow the matter points to
fulfill Leibniz’ principle of the identity of indiscernibles in that they can be absolutely
discernible:2 it is possible that each matter point is distinct from all the other ones by
some of the distance relations that it bears to other matter points. If they are absolutely
discernible, the matter points are individuals by the standards commonly used in the
philosophy of physics. As the development of ontic structural realism has made clear,
2Recall that two entities are absolutely discernible if and only if there is a physically meaningful monadic
predicate or, more generally, a physically meaningful formula with one free variable that applies to
one but not to the other.
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neither individuality nor absolute distinguishability need to be grounded in intrinsic
features (Ladyman 2007 nicely illustrates this point). In a nutshell, the famous slogan
“No entity without identity” coined by Quine (1969, p. 23) applies to the matter points,
although they are primitive stuff: they do not have an intrinsic identity, but a relational
one provided by spatial distances that can be so strong that it makes them absolutely
discernible entities. Furthermore, if they are particles, their trajectories endow them
with a diachronic relational identity: each particle is absolutely discernible from the
other ones not only by its position at any given time, but also by its history.
To sum up, the matter points are primitive stuff in the following two senses: (a) they
are fundamental – that is, they are not composed of anything else, but their configura-
tions compose everything else; (b) they are primitive objects – that is, they do not have
an intrinsic essence constituted by intrinsic properties. However, they are not primitive
in the sense of possessing a primitive stuff-essence: they are not bare substrata. If they
have an essence, the relations in which they stand and that individuate them, namely
the metrical relations, are their essence.
As regards the metaphysical literature on objects, the primitive ontology of primi-
tive stuff motivated by quantum physics falls into neither of the two main stances: it
obviously does not conceive objects as bundles of properties, since there are no such
properties available in quantum physics; and it does not conceive objects as bare sub-
strata either. By contrast, it joins the stance of moderate ontic structural realism in the
philosophy of science by being committed to objects, but maintaining that these objects
are individuated by certain relations in which they stand, namely metrical relations.
Coming back to the metaphysical literature, the view that comes closest to this one is
the proposal by Heil (2003, 2012) according to which there are substances, but these
substances are not bare particulars: they always exist in certain ways (modes) of being
that individuate them. However, whereas Heil conceives these ways of being as intrin-
sic features of these substances and refuses to admit any relations on the ontological
ground floor (see Heil 2012, ch. 7), in the primitive ontology of quantum physics, there
are, as mentioned above, no such intrinsic features available. We therefore have to go
structural, conceiving the relations in which these substances stand as their basic way
of being, namely the metrical relations. Nonetheless, we thereby join an old tradition,
namely the Cartesian one of conceiving matter as res extensa only.
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3 The Physics of Matter as Primitive Stuff
Let us turn to Bohmian mechanics in order to illustrate the physics of matter as primi-
tive stuff, since Bohmian mechanics is the best known example of a primitive ontology
formulation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics and since it is the only primitive on-
tology theory for which there is a version worked out in terms of permutation invariance
available. Although, if spelled out in a consequent manner, the primitive ontology of
matter as primitive stuff should go with relationalism about space, we will use for the
sake of this illustration the formulation in terms of an absolute background space with
some points of that space being occupied, whereby these occupied points make up the
configuration of matter in the universe. Our primary aim in this section is to show what
the physics of primitive stuff in contrast to the physics of material objects with intrinsic
essences looks like. Casting that physics at the same time in relationalist terms about
space and time would by far go beyond a single paper – the main challenge in this respect
is to investigate whether Bohmian mechanics admits a universal wave-function that has
all the right symmetries to depend only on the metrical relations between the particles.
Bohmian mechanics, as commonly presented (see the papers in Dürr, Goldstein and
Zanghì 2013 and the textbook Dürr and Teufel 2009), is a theory about point particles
moving in three-dimensional space, whereby the quantum wave-function figures in a non-
local law of motion for the configuration of particles. Usually, the theory is introduced by
formulating the laws of motion on the configuration space R3N , where N is the number
of particles and Q(t) = (Q1(t), . . . , QN (t)) ∈ R3N represents their positions at time t.
The configuration then evolves according to the guiding equation
dQk
dt =
~
mk
ψ∗∇ψ
ψ∗ψ
(Q1, . . . , QN ), (1)
where ψ(q1, . . . , qn) is the wave-function representing the quantum state of the system.
The time-evolution of this wave-function, in turn, is given by the Schrödinger equation
ı~
∂ψ
∂t
=
(
−
N∑
j=1
~2
2mj
∆j + V (q1, . . . , qn)
)
ψ, (2)
familiar from standard quantum mechanics. The non-local character of the law is man-
ifested in the fact that the velocity of any particle at time t depends on the position of
every other particle at time t; the law of motion, in other words, describes the evolution
of the particle configuration as a whole. This is necessary in order to take quantum
non-locality – as illustrated for instance by Bell’s theorem (Bell 1987, ch. 2) – into
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account.
The parameters mk appearing in equation (1) and (2) correspond to the mass of the
k-th particle. Furthermore, we observe that for (static) electromagnetic interactions, the
charges ek of the particles enter the Schrödinger equation via the Coulomb potential3
V (q1, . . . , qn) =
∑
i<j
eiej
‖qi − qj‖ . (3)
We will address the status of these parameters later in this section.
It is important to note that, on a fundamental level, there is only one wave-function
in Bohmian mechanics: the universal wave-function Ψ, guiding the motion of all the
particles in the universe together. Nonetheless, in many relevant cases, it is possible
to provide a description of a (suitably isolated) subsystem as an autonomous Bohmian
system in terms of an effective wave-function ψ, which is derived from capital Ψ and the
actual spatial configuration of the environment, that is, the rest of the universe that is
“ignored” in the description of the subsystem. These effective wave-functions can be seen
as the Bohmian analogue of the usual quantum wave-functions familiar from textbook
quantum mechanics.
An easy mistake in connection with Bohmian mechanics is to confuse the theories’
commitment to particle positions with a realism regarding any of the physical quantities
commonly associated with quantum mechanical observables. In fact, the opposite is
correct. Bohmian mechanics is a theory about the motion of particles, conceived as
the basic constituents of matter, and hence a theory about the distribution of matter
in space and time. A statistical analysis of this theory, for situations corresponding to
quantum measurements, then reproduces the outcome statistics of textbook quantum
mechanics in terms of the effective wave-function (the quantum state) ψ of the measured
microscopic subsystem. The respective measurement outcomes, however, do not reflect
any properties that the particles possess over and above their spatial configuration,
but are shown to arise from their disposition of motion, which is encoded in ψ, upon
interaction with a macroscopic measurement apparatus.
A paradigmatic example is the Bohmian treatment of spin. In the token measurement
of spin, let’s say in the z-direction, a particle is sent through an inhomogeneous magnetic
field (a Stern-Gerlach magnet) and then detected on a screen to see if it was deflected
upwards or downwards, corresponding to the measurement outcome “spin up” or “spin
down”, respectively. How does Bohmian mechanics account for this experiment?
3If the full electromagnetic interactions are taken into account, the gradient in equation (1) is replaced
by a covariant derivative, into which the vector potential and the particle charges enter.
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Consider a particle whose (effective) quantum state is described by a spinor-valued
wave-function of the form
ψ(q) =
(
ϕ1(q)
ϕ2(q)
)
=
(
ϕ1(q)
(
1
0
)
+ ϕ2(q)
(
0
1
))
. (4)
The Schrödinger time-evolution for ψ in an inhomogeneous magnetic field4 is such that
the part of the wave-function corresponding to the upper spin-component is propagating
in the positive z-direction, whereas the part of the wave-function corresponding to the
lower spin-component is propagating in the negative z-direction. Consequently, the
two spin-components of the initial wave-function (4) become spatially separated. The
trajectory of the particle, determined by equation (1), will then follow one of the two
wave-packets, depending on its initial position, and thus hit the screen above or below the
zero-line, corresponding to a measurement of “z-spin up” or “z-spin down”, respectively
(for a detailed account of spin in Bohmian mechanics see Dürr and Teufel 2009, ch. 8.4,
and Norsen 2014). Hence, we see in particular that the measured spin-value does not
correspond to any property that the particle possesses over and above its position. For
a Bohmian particle to have “spin up” or “spin down” means nothing more and nothing
less than to be “guided” by the part of the wave-function that corresponds to the upper
or lower spinor-component, that is, to move – in the pertinent measurement-context –
in the respective way.
A different issue is the status of the dynamical parameters mass and charge, which
occur in Schrödinger’s equation (2) and – in the case of mass – in the Bohmian guiding
equation (1). The crucial observation here is that the way in which the parameters mk
and ek figure in equation (2), and thus the evolution of the wave-function on configuration
space, is insensitive to the actual configuration of the particles in physical space. For this
reason, it is inappropriate, in general, to think of mass and charge as intrinsic properties
of the Bohmian particles which are “carried along” as they move in space.
This point is illustrated very clearly in the following experiment: consider a charged
particle whose (effective) wave-function is of the form ψ = φA + φB, where φA and
φB are of equal size and shape but concentrated on two distant regions of space that
we denote by A and B, respectively. (Those regions could be surrounded by infinite
high potential walls – or, more simply put, a box – to keep the wave-function from
spreading.) The particle will be located in one of those regions, let’s say in A. Not
surprisingly, the trajectory of a second charged particle passing near A will be affected
4More precisely, ψ is governed by the Pauli equation, which is the non-relativistic wave-equation de-
scribing particles with spin.
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by the electromagnetic interactions and deflected towards A, if it has opposite charge, or
away from A if it has equal charge as particle one. However, if that second particle were
passing near region B, it would be affected in the very same way, no matter how far
away that is from the actual position of the other particle. This scenario demonstrates,
firstly, the explicitly non-local character of Bohmian mechanics. It also shows that it
would thus be wrong to think of charge in the familiar way as something localized at the
position of the particles. A similar reasoning would apply to the particle mass, in so far
as gravitational interactions play a role in quantum mechanics.
A common reply to this issue is that mass and charge should be regarded not as prop-
erties of the particle, but as properties of the wave-function, the intuition (presumably)
being that the absolute value of ψ – or rather |ψ|2 – can represent (something akin to) a
charge distribution. But this view is untenable for a variety of reasons. To begin with,
we have already seen that the view of (effective) wave-functions as physical entities over
and above the particles is unwarranted. If the wave-function associated with a particle
is not a physical entity, it cannot carry physical properties. Moreover, as soon as we
consider an entangled wave-function of two or more particles, it will correspond to a (non
factorizing) function on a high-dimensional configuration space and cannot be taken to
represent a distribution of physical quantitates in three-dimensional space.
So what attitude shall we adopt vis-à-vis mass and charge in Bohmian mechanics?
First and foremost, one should take the theory seriously in its own right and acknowledge
that all the (classical) intuitions that we associate with mass and charge are a priori
questionable. In the first instance, m1, . . . ,mN and e1, . . . , eN are merely numerical
parameters that appear in the formulation of the Bohmian laws of motion. To illustrate
this point, let us assume for the moment that there exists but a single species of particles,
i.e. that mk = ml = m and ek = el = e for all k, l ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Hence, we see from
equations (1) and (2) that we are left with the same three constants ~,m, and e appearing
in the equation of motion for any of the N particles. There is then plainly no reason to
treat m and e differently from Planck’s constant ~. In particular, there is no justification
to attach m or e to the particles or to interpret them as localized physical quantities,
any more than we would do for ~. Rather we would regard m and e as nothing more
than two additional constants of nature, numerical parameters entering the equations of
motion without referring to anything in the physical ontology.
However, the commitment to a single type of particle, that is, a single elementary
mass and charge, is clearly unsustainable from a physical point of view. Modern particle
physics introduces an entire zoo of elementary particles varying in mass or charge or both:
electrons, positrons, muons, anti-muons, the nucleons, respectively their constituent
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quarks, and so on. Hence, there must be something in the world which makes it the case
that certain terms (respectively certain coordinates) in the equations of motion refer to,
say, an electron rather than a muon.
Goldstein et al. (2005b,a) demonstrated the possibility to account for the different
species of elementary particles in modern particle physics by reformulating Bohmian
mechanics in a way that reflects the ontological commitment to propertyless particles
as primitive stuff, treating all particles as identical. To appreciate what this means and
how the reformulation is carried out, let us begin with the following observation. If we
insist that particles are distinguished only by their position, that is, spatial relations
instead of intrinsic properties, we note that the configuration space R3N has too much
mathematical structure in that it “cares” about permutations of the particle labels. That
is to say the following: the nature of the Bohmian law of motion (being a first-order
differential equation on configuration space) is such that it determines at every time t
the change of the system’s spatial configuration depending on the current configuration
Q(t). However, unless one presupposes a primitive identity or haecceity of the particles,
the instantaneous configuration of an N -particle system is completely characterized by
a set of N points in physical space that are designated as being occupied by matter.
There are no intrinsic properties, nor internal or external relations distinguishing the
configuration represented by the tuple (Q1, Q2, . . . , QN ) from, let’s say, the configuration
represented by the tuple (Q2, Q1, . . . , QN ) with the particles 1 and 2 interchanged. It is
thus understood that – for so-called identical or indistinguishable particles – the natural
configuration space of an N -particle system is not R3N , but
NR3 :=
{
S ⊆ R3 | ]S = N
}
, (5)
which is the set of all subsets of R3 containing exactly N elements. Note that this
space lacks the mathematical structure to represent permutations of the particle labels
in contrast to R3N : a point Q(t) = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QN} ∈ NR3 – in contrast to the ordered
N-tupel (Q1, Q2, . . . , QN ) – describes the fact that at time t there is a particle occupying
space-point Q1, a particle occupying space-point Q2, and so on; it does not state that
particle 1 occupies Q1, particle 2 occupies Q2, etc.
Consequently, the wave-function of the system should now be defined on the config-
uration space NR3 as well, which in fact can be done (Goldstein et al. 2005b, section
4). Nevertheless, it is still more convenient, in general, to represent the quantum state
as a function on R3N (which can be regarded, mathematically, as the universal covering
space of NR3). As long as we consider a system in which all particles are associated
with the same mass and charge, the demand of consistency then leads immediately to
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a wave-function that is symmetric or anti-symmetric under permutations of the particle
coordinates and hence to the famous boson/fermion alternative. In Dürr et al. (2006),
NR3 was thus already introduced as the configuration space of identical or indistinguish-
able particles, referring to a single species of particles, and it is shown how the quantum
statistics of identical particles thus arise in the Bohmian theory (see also Dürr and Teufel
2009, ch. 8.5).
However, we now note that as soon as we have to admit more than one value for the
parameters mk, the standard formulation of Bohmian mechanics breaks down. That is
because equation (1) no longer defines a law of motion on NR3, since it discriminates
different particles by their associated mass, while configurations represented on NR3 do
not do so. The basic idea of Goldstein et al. (2005b,a) is thus to symmetrize equation
(1) in order to get a permutation invariant equation, because any permutation invariant
equation on R3N defines, in a canonical way, a law of motion on NR3, the configuration
space of identical particles. In this way, they show that we can treat all particles as
identical, while still accounting for the empirical data that, as usual, are explained in
terms of a particle “zoo”.
To preserve equivariance of the law, i.e. the conservation of total probability by the
Bohmian flow, the symmetrization has to be done in the following way. The standard
guiding equation (1) can be written in the form
dQ
dt =
j (Q(t))
ρ (Q(t)) , (6)
where
ρ = ψ∗ψ
is the probability density and j = (j1, . . . , jN ) with
ji =
~
mi
Imψ∗∇iψ
the probability current corresponding to the system’s wave-function ψ. In equation (6),
numerator and denominator have to be symmetrized independently by summing over all
possible permutations of the particle labels 1, . . . , N . Hence, we get a new, permutation-
invariant guiding equation, which reads
dQk
dt =
∑
σ∈SN jσ(k) ◦ σ∑
σ∈SN ρ ◦ σ
(Q(t)). (7)
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Here, the sum goes over all elements of the permutation group SN , and
σQ :=
(
Qσ−1(1), . . . , Qσ−1(N)
)
means that every coordinate Qi is assigned a new index Qσ−1(i), changing the order in
the N -tupel.
In this theory, which Goldstein et al. (2005b,a) dubbed identity-based Bohmian me-
chanics, we do not attribute a priori any mass to any specific particle. The law of motion
merely determines N trajectories for N particles, and it is a characteristic of this law
that one of those trajectories happens to behave – at least in the relevant circumstances
– like the trajectory of a particle with mass m1, another like the trajectory of a particle
with mass m2, and so on, depending only on the (contingent) initial conditions of the
system, respectively the universe.
To illustrate how this works, let us discuss an example given in Goldstein et al.
(2005b, section 3) that compares the standard formulation of Bohmian mechanics with
the identity-based version. Consider a two-particle universe consisting of an electron
with mass me and a muon with mass mµ. Suppose, for simplicity, that they are in a
non-entangled state Ψ(q1, q2) = φ(q1)χ(q2) (note that we could symmetrize this wave-
function, though this would be redundant when plugged into the symmetrized guiding-
equation). Then, the standard guiding law (1) leads to the following equations of motion:
dQ1
dt =
~
me
Im ∇φ(Q1)
φ(Q1)
,
dQ2
dt =
~
mµ
Im ∇χ(Q2)
χ(Q2)
.
(8)
In contrast, the symmetrized guiding equation (7) reads
dQ1
dt =
~
me
|χ(Q2)|2 Im (φ∗(Q1)∇φ(Q1)) + ~mµ |φ(Q2)|
2 Im (χ∗(Q1)∇χ(Q1))
|φ(Q1)|2 |χ(Q2)|2 + |φ(Q2)|2 |χ(Q1)|2
dQ2
dt =
~
mµ
|φ(Q1)|2 Im (χ∗(Q2)∇χ(Q2)) + ~me |χ(Q1)|
2 Im (φ∗(Q2)∇φ(Q2))
|φ(Q1)|2 |χ(Q2)|2 + |φ(Q2)|2 |χ(Q1)|2
.
(9)
We see that equation (8) ascribes – or presupposes – an intrinsic mass and thus a distinct
type to every particle: particle 1, described by the coordinates Q1, is the electron with
mass me, while particle 2, described by the coordinates Q2, is the muon with mass mµ.
In equation (9), by contrast, neither Q1 nor Q2 is designated as the position of the
electron, respectively the muon. A priori, the two particles are distinguished only by
16
the position that they occupy at time t. However, if we consider a situation in which φ
and χ have disjoint support, say, when one wave-packet is propagating to the left and
the other one to the right, one of the two sums in the nominators and denominators
will be zero, so that the equation of motion effectively reduces to equation (8) (possibly
with the indices 1 and 2 interchanged). This is to say, in particular, that in situations
where the two-particle wave-function is suitably decohered, one of the particles will play
the role of the electron – being effectively described by equations (1) and (2) with the
parameter me – while the other one will play the role of the muon – being effectively
described by equations (1) and (2) with parameter mµ.
Which trajectory turns out to be guided by which part of the wave-function thereby
depends only on the law of motion and the (contingent) initial conditions of the system,
rather than on intrinsic properties of the particles. In fact, if both parts of the wave-
function were brought back together and then separated again, one and the same particle
could switch its role from being the electron to being the muon, and vice versa. Hence,
like a particle’s spin, we must conclude that to be an electron, a muon, or a positron,
etc. is nothing more and nothing less than to move – in the relevant circumstances –
electronwise, muonwise, or positronwise, and so forth. There are no properties in this
theory defining different species of particles, but only primitive stuff, following a law of
motion that accounts for the phenomena conventionally attributed to a multiplicity of
particle-types.
Apart from such circumstances in which the different parts of the wave-function are
well separated, one could say that the particles in the previous example are guided
by a superposition of (what one would usually call) an electron wave-function and a
muon wave-function. However, it would be misleading to claim that this amounts to
a superposition of being an electron and being a muon. Ontologically, there are no
superpositions of anything, only propertyless particles moving on definite trajectories.
Rather, the labels “electron”, “muon”, etc. are meaningless in the general case.
One obvious objection to the move proposed by Goldstein et. al. is that the guiding
law (7) is much more contrived than the one in standard Bohmian mechanics. To some
extent, this is a correct observation and we are indeed trading a sparse ontology for a
more complicated mathematical formalism by endorsing the symmetrized theory. That
notwithstanding, a few things can be said to address this worry. First, one should note
that the apparent complexity of equation (7) is really just the price for expressing a law
of motion for configurations in NR3 on the coordinate space R3N and doesn’t necessarily
amount to more complicated physics. Second, it should be noted that (modulo some
subtleties discussed by Goldstein et al. 2005b,a) the symmetrized theory will give rise
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to the familiar statistical description of subsystems in terms of effective wave-functions,
which is really all that matters for most practical purposes.
In this context, it should also be noted that, given the universal wave-function, the
“right” statistical description of subsystems – that is, the one agreeing with the predic-
tions of standard quantum mechanics, arises for typical initial conditions in terms of the
particle configuration, that is, in quantum equilibrium (see Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì
2013, ch. 2). Hence, the emergence of different particle types as empirically observed in
nature is not attributed to special initial conditions (quite the opposite), though it is
ascribed to the particular form of the universal wave-function, i.e. to the physical law, if
the latter is understood as nomological (we will expand on the nomological view of the
wave-function in the upcoming sections).
Finally, concerning the (empirical) content of the proposed theory, it should be empha-
sized that the trajectories described by identity-based Bohmian mechanics will in general
differ from those obtained from standard Bohmian mechanics, but that the statistical
predictions for experimental outcomes are the same. In this sense, the symmetrized
theory is empirically equivalent to Bohmian mechanics and hence empirically equivalent
to standard quantum mechanics. This shows, once more, that the physical ontology can
neither be empirically determined, nor read off from the measurement-formalism of stan-
dard quantum mechanics, while, on the other hand, the choice of a primitive ontology
can supplement or enlighten the structure and formulation of the theory.
In particular, if the physical ontology is one of propertyless particles, this strongly
suggests permutation invariant laws of motion in which all particles are treated as iden-
tical – to borrow once more the terminology commonly employed in physics. Of course,
this terminology is misleading in the sense that there is obviously a plurality of parti-
cles instead of just one particle. The meaning of identity-based Bohmian mechanics –
and more particularly the meaning of permutation invariance within this framework – is
rather that we are committed to an ontology of primitive stuff in the sense of particles
that do not possess any intrinsic properties nor any intrinsic identity. Permutation in-
variance thus means precisely that there is nothing to the particles beyond their position
in the total configuration, in particular nothing that the laws of motion could refer to
in order to establish a different dynamical role for different particles depending on some
intrinsic characteristics.
To sum up, identity-based Bohmian mechanics provides for a clear ontological meaning
of permutation invariance: it encodes a primitive stuff ontology of individuals without
any intrinsic identity and properties, though (absolutely) discernible in virtue of their
position in the total configuration. Furthermore, permutation invariance applies here to
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all the particles, since there is only primitive stuff and no different species of particles,
by contrast to concerning only the particles of the same species as in standard Bohmian
mechanics or the wave-function supposedly corresponding to particles of the same species
as in textbook quantum mechanics.
4 The Humean Best System Analysis of the Dynamical
Variables
Staying within the framework of a primitive ontology of particles as in Bohmian me-
chanics, how are we to conceive dynamical variables such as mass or charge that are
attributed to the particles taken individually without making up for intrinsic essences
that constitute different species of particles? Moreover, as mentioned in section 1, in
the primitive ontology approach, it is reasonable to conceive the quantum state as a
nomological entity by contrast to a physical entity on a par with the primitive ontol-
ogy. But what does this mean? In this section and the next one, we will show that the
main philosophical views about laws of nature can be employed in order to answer these
questions. We will focus on Humeanism on the one hand and dispositionalism on the
other.
Let us start with Humeanism. According to this view, the world is a vast mosaic of
local matters of particular fact, such as point particles being connected only by relations
of spatio-temporal distance. Given an initial configuration of such point particles, there
is nothing about that configuration that puts a constraint on its temporal development.
A certain temporal development just happens to occur; there is nothing that guides,
governs, or determines it. Nevertheless, considering that temporal development as a
whole – that is, the distribution of the point particles throughout the whole of space-
time –, that distribution exhibits certain patterns or regularities. Consequently, if one
sets out to put forward a description of the distribution of the point particles in space-
time, one can do better than dressing a very long list that registers each particle position.
According to what is known as the Humean best system account, the laws of nature are
the axioms of the system that achieves the best balance between being simple and being
informative in describing the distribution of matter throughout the whole of space and
time. In brief, laws of nature both simplify and are informative, striking the best balance
between these two virtues (see notably Lewis 1973, ch. 3.3, pp. 72–75, and 1994, section
3, as well as Cohen and Callender 2009; there is no space here and it is not the aim of
this paper to consider the internal problems of Humeanism).
Hall (2009, § 5.2), in particular, has put forward a version of Humeanism that regards
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the vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact as consisting only in point particles
standing in relations of spatio-temporal distance. These particles are just primitive stuff.
Their distribution throughout space-time – that is, the development of the metrical
relations among the particles – exhibits certain regularities. Suppose that the laws of
classical mechanics and electrodynamics figure in the Humean best system that captures
these regularities. Then dynamical variables such as mass and charge appear in these
laws. On the basis of these laws being part of the Humean best system, one can then
attribute properties like mass and charge to the particles. That is to say: predicates such
as “mass” and “charge” apply to the particles. However, these predicates do not represent
properties that the particles have per se, as something essential or intrinsic to them.
They apply to the particles in virtue of the contingent fact that their motion throughout
the whole of space-time happens to manifest certain regularities. Hence, what makes
the application of these predicates true is nothing over and above the distribution of
primitive stuff throughout space and time. Nonetheless, this is not instrumentalism:
Humeanism, applied to the primitive ontology approach in physics, is the view that the
primitive ontology is the entire ontology. However, the primitive ontology is an ontology
that stands on its own feet: it consists in theoretical entities such as point particles that
exist in the world independently of observers and their beliefs.
This idea can also be applied to the wave-function in any of the primitive ontology
theories of quantum physics, notably Bohmian mechanics (see Miller 2014, Esfeld 2014,
Callender 2014; see also already Dickson 2000). It can thus be employed to spell out what
it means that the wave-function is nomological by contrast to being a physical entity on
a par with the primitive ontology. Again, the Humean mosaic consists in the distribution
of primitive stuff throughout the whole of space-time – such as particle trajectories, flash-
events, or a matter density field. That distribution exhibits certain regularities. Suppose
that the laws of quantum mechanics figure in the Humean best system that captures these
regularities, and let these laws be the Bohmian guiding equation and the Schrödinger
equation, or a GRW-type equation and a law establishing a link with the primitive
ontology. Then a universal wave-function describing the quantum state of the primitive
stuff appears in these laws, and the quantum state includes parameters such as mass and
charge. However, as these latter parameters do not require an ontological commitment
to anything more than the distribution of primitive stuff throughout the whole of space-
time in classical mechanics, so the quantum state is no addition to being: given the whole
distribution of the primitive stuff throughout space-time, a law describing the temporal
development of a universal wave-function enters into the Humean best system as a means
to achieve a description of the distribution of the primitive stuff that strikes the best
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balance between being simple and being informative about how the stuff is distributed.
This law simplifies and is informative in any case, since in a deterministic theory such as
Bohmian mechanics, specifying the particle configuration and the wave-function at any
given time is sufficient to capture the particle configuration at any other time. Given
the law in which the wave-function figures, one can then attribute a quantum state as
represented by the universal wave-function to the particle configuration, in the sense
that the propositions doing so are true; but their truth-maker is the distribution of the
primitive stuff throughout the whole of space-time, and not a quantum state that exists
over and above the particle configuration.
Finally, coming back to the link between the primitive ontology approach to physics
and relationalism about space-time, one can apply the Humean view of the primitive
ontology being the entire ontology to space-time itself. Suppose that there is an initial
configuration of matter points that are primitive stuff and that are connected by metrical
relations. The matter points move so that there is change in their spatial relations
and thus a temporal development of the initial configuration of matter points. On
Humeanism, there is nothing that puts a constraint on how that change has to occur.
Some such change just happens. If one combines Humeanism with relationalism about
space and time, there is furthermore nothing about that initial configuration that singles
out a particular motion as inertial motion and a particular system of matter points as
an inertial system. However, as Huggett (2006) has shown, given the whole motion of
the matter points, there are some patterns or regularities in this motion that make it
possible to conceive a Humean best system achieving a good balance between being
simple and being informative in describing that motion. Based on this best system, one
can then single out a certain motion as inertial and certain systems of matter points
as inertial systems. One can thus account for absolute quantities such as acceleration
in an ontology of a Humean space-time relationalism applied to the laws of Newtonian
mechanics.
It is evident that this strategy can be put to work for any space-time, not only a
Newtonian one, as Humeanism is applicable to any primitive ontology theory of matter.
One has to assume an initial configuration of extended stuff – such as matter points
being connected by metrical relations –, that configuration happens to develop in a cer-
tain matter. Considering that development as a whole, it exhibits certain patterns or
regularities. Based on these patterns or regularities, there is a Humean best system
including the laws of both matter and space-time. Given that system, dynamical vari-
ables can be attributed to the matter points, some systems of them can be singled out
as inertial systems, etc. On Humeanism, whatever properties are attributed to matter
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or space-time come all in one package, figuring in the Humean best system and being
defined by their role in that system, instead of being properties that belong to matter
or space-time as such.
5 Modal Realism about the Dynamical Variables
Although Humeanism is a coherent philosophical way to conceive matter as primitive
stuff, showing how all the dynamical variables that are commonly attributed to material
objects can be derived from the Humean best system, the physics of matter as primitive
stuff is not committed to the metaphysics of Humeanism. In other words, if the universal
wave-function is nomological rather than a physical object on a par with the primitive
ontology, its nomological character does not have to be spelled out in the framework
of Humeanism about laws of nature. Indeed, there are many well known philosophical
reservations against Humeanism in general. In particular, Humeanism cannot but regard
it as a brute fact that the regularities on which we rely in science as well as in everyday
life always turn out to be well-confirmed. There is no constraint at all on which local
matters of particular fact can and which ones cannot occur in the future of any given
local matter of particular fact, since what the laws of nature are depends on what
there will be in the future of any given local matter of particular fact, instead of that
future depending on the laws of nature. Hence, the laws of nature cannot be invoked
to answer the question of why certain regularities – such as e.g. those ones experienced
as gravitation, or those exhibited in the EPR-experiment – always turn out to be well-
confirmed. There simply is no answer to that question in Humeanism. Again, there
is nothing incoherent about this position. Yet the desire to obtain an answer to that
question motivates the search for a more ambitious metaphysical framework, that is, one
that admits modal connections in nature which put a constraint on what can and what
cannot happen in the universe given an arbitrary initial configuration of matter.
The central anti-Humean answer to this question consists in anchoring the laws of
nature in properties that are attributed to the physical systems (see notably Bird 2007).
These properties are such that it is essential for them to exercise a certain dynamical
role for the temporal development of the physical systems. The laws, in turn, express
that dynamical role. These properties hence are dispositions or powers. Thus, on this
view, mass and charge in classical mechanics are local properties of the particles whose
function is to accelerate the particles as described by the laws of Newtonian mechanics
and classical electromagnetism. By way of consequence, on dispositionalism combined
with a primitive ontology view of classical mechanics, the primitive stuff particles do
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indeed obtain properties each over and above standing in metrical relations. But these
properties are not essential to the particles, and their role is not to provide an intrin-
sic identity of the particles; their job exclusively is a dynamical one, namely to put a
constraint on how the particles move, given an initial configuration of particles whose
identity is provided by the metrical relations in which they stand.
When it comes to quantum physics, it is no longer possible to conceive mass and charge
as local dispositional properties or powers that belong to the particles taken individually,
as various thought experiments such as the ones mentioned in section 3 make clear (and
see Brown et al. 1995 for more such experiments). Against this background, we have
argued in section 3 that what stands for mass and charge in the equation of motion
are mere parameters without any direct ontological correlate. In brief, there are no
mass and charge distributions influencing the motion of the particles. There only is the
universal wave-function representing the quantum state. However, the quantum state is
defined on configuration space. Hence, if one intends to attribute to the quantum state
an ontological weight as a dynamical variable – by contrast to regarding it simply as
a convenient means to capture the salient regularities in the motion that the particles
happen to take –, one faces the difficulty of having to avoid the incoherent dualism
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, namely the dualism of being committed to
particles existing in physical space and a quantum state existing in configuration space.
Dispositionalism avoids this pitfall in the following manner: as in classical physics
the particles taken individually instantiate dynamical, dispositional properties that de-
termine their motion and that are represented by the mass and the charge variables
in the laws of motion, so in quantum physics, the particle configuration as a whole in-
stantiates a dynamical, dispositional property that determines its temporal development
and that is represented by the universal wave-function figuring in the laws of (identity-
based) Bohmian mechanics or the GRW theory. In brief, according to dispositionalism,
the universal wave-function represents the common disposition of motion of the particle
configuration (see Belot 2012, pp. 77-80, and Esfeld et al. 2014, sections 4 and 5). The
motion of the particles is then such that, in certain specific circumstances, it is possible
to consider them as if they were carrying some local properties such as mass and charge
that influence their motion, even though, from an ontological point of view, there is no
such thing. Behaving like a “massive particle” or a “charged particle” is only the result
of the particular particle motion (rather than its determinant) and contingent on the
universal wave-function and the initial conditions.
In the framework of dispositionalism, the shift from classical to quantum mechanics
hence amounts to a shift from local dynamical properties determining the motion of
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the particles to one holistic property of the particle configuration (the quantum state,
represented by the universal wave-function) doing so. It is then more appropriate to
characterize this property as a power than as a disposition, since if there is one holistic
property of the particle configuration determining its temporal development, there is no
question of an external stimulus or triggering condition for its manifestation (as a mass
or a charge qua local property of a particle requires another massy or charged particle
to manifest itself in the acceleration of the particles). In brief, on Bohmian disposi-
tionalism, the primitive stuff particles collectively instantiate one power (represented by
the universal wave-function) that determines their motion by determining their velocity.
Consequently, this collective power relates strictly speaking all the particles with one an-
other, determining their motion in tandem so to speak and thereby explaining quantum
entanglement and the EPR correlations.
In general, if dispositions or powers instantiated by the particles taken individually
can influence their motion, so can a collective power instantiated by the particle config-
uration. In both cases, the particle positions, consisting in the metrical relations that
individuate them, by no means fix the disposition or power that determines the mo-
tion and thus the temporal development of the particle positions (i.e., their metrical
relations). Such a disposition or power is in any case a modal property that has to be
admitted in addition to the primitive ontology, but instantiated by the elements of the
primitive ontology, as that what fixes what is possible and what is not possible about
their motion. The metaphysical conception of dispositionalism applied to the primi-
tive ontology of physics – that is, the commitment to properties as that what puts a
constraint on the temporal development of the primitive stuff – is the same in both
cases. A holistic property or collective power doing so is no less intelligible and no more
mysterious than local properties or powers doing so. The latter just are more familiar
to us given our familiarity with classical physics and our unfamiliarity with quantum
physics. In other words, the shift from local properties to holistic or collective properties
is imposed upon us by the transition from classical to quantum physics. Any philosoph-
ical theory of properties has to adapt itself to this shift. Dispositionalism does so by
countenancing dynamical properties (dispositions, powers) that are instantiated by the
particle configuration as a whole instead of by the particles taken individually.
One can further illustrate this conception by linking it up with ontic structural real-
ism. Since this collective power relates all the particles with one another, one can also
conceive it as a structure defined on the configuration of the particles. This again is
an ontic structure since, according to dispositionalism, it exists in the world over and
above the primitive stuff (the particle configuration), albeit instantiated by it. However,
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one has to be careful not to confuse this ontic structure with the relational or structural
individuation of the primitive stuff explained at the end of section 2: quantum entangle-
ment conceived as an ontic structure in the framework of the physics of primitive stuff
has nothing to do with the individuation or the discernibility of the physical entities;
that individuation and discernibility, both at a time and in time, is obtained through
the metrical relations in which the matter points stand at any time. It is not touched
by the issue of Humeanism vs. modal realism (dispositionalism) as regards the laws of
nature. The entanglement structure, by contrast, concerns only the dynamics of the
matter points. If this structure exists over and above the matter points, it is a modal
structure, putting a constraint on the temporal development of the matter points (their
motion), whereas there is nothing modal about the metrical relations or structure insofar
as they individuate the matter points, accounting for these points being matter points
and being absolutely discernible. By way of consequence, only the modal realist but not
the Humean is committed to the entanglement structure.
6 Conclusion
This paper started from recalling the two principled options for an ontology of quantum
physics: (1) quantum state realism, according to which the quantum state as defined
by the universal wave-function on configuration space is the physical reality, and (2)
a primitive ontology theory, according to which the physical reality consists in matter
existing in three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time. The aim of this
paper was to push the primitive ontology option to its ultimate consequence, which is to
regard matter as primitive stuff, namely as points that are matter points only in virtue
of the metrical relations in which they stand; in particular, these matter points do not
carry any intrinsic properties and do not possess any intrinsic identity. The metrical
relations individuate them, making them (absolutely) discernible. These matter points
are particles, if they persist and if their motion traces out continuous lines in space
(worldlines that can be conceived as particle trajectories). Consequently, there are no
different particle species in the fundamental ontology and “permuting” the particles
obviously does not lead to any new physical situation. There just are propertyless
particles qua matter points. We have shown how this view is naturally encoded in
identity-based Bohmian mechanics.
We then elaborated on two principled options for introducing physical properties
through the role that they play for the dynamics of the primitive stuff. According
to Humeanism, there is nothing over and above the primitive stuff throughout space
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and time. Given an initial configuration of primitive stuff, a certain temporal develop-
ment of that configuration happens to occur. But there is nothing in nature that puts a
constraint on which temporal development can happen and which one cannot happen.
Given the distribution of primitive stuff throughout the whole of space–time, that dis-
tribution happens to exhibit certain patterns or regularities, which make it possible to
formulate a Humean best system. The variables figuring in the Humean best system
can then be attributed to the primitive stuff, but they do not represent an ontological
commitment to anything over and above spatio-temporally extended primitive stuff.
According to modal realism, by contrast, there is something in nature over and above
the primitive stuff that puts a constraint on its temporal development, fixing what can
and what cannot happen given an initial configuration of primitive stuff. Disposition-
alism spells this idea out in terms of dispositions or powers that the primitive stuff
instantiates over and above being individuated by the metrical relations in which the
matter points stand. These dispositions or powers enter the ontology only through the
role that they play in determining a certain temporal development of the primitive stuff.
They thereby ground the laws of nature. In classical physics, these are dispositions or
powers that are instantiated by the matter points (the particles) taken individually; in
quantum physics, there is in the fundamental ontology only one collective power instan-
tiated by the configuration of the matter points (the particles) as a whole, tying their
temporal development together.
To sum up, the primitive ontology option applies to both classical and quantum
physics. If one endorses a primitive ontology of particles, the primitive ontology is
the same in classical and quantum physics: particles as primitive stuff, individuated by
the metrical relations in which they stand. The difference between classical and quantum
physics concerns only the dynamics, namely the dynamical properties (dispositionalism)
or predicates (Humeanism) attributed to the particles in order to account for the change
in their metrical relations (that is, their motion): local properties in classical physics, a
collective one in quantum physics.
Against the background of what has been achieved in this paper, we regard it as the
foremost task for metaphysics to put the arguments for and against Humeanism and
modal realism (dispositionalism) in the framework of a primitive ontology of primitive
stuff shared by both these metaphysical stances. As concerns the physics, we take it to
be the foremost task to elaborate on the link between the primitive ontology of primitive
stuff and relationalism about space-time, thereby also extending this ontology beyond
classical and quantum mechanics.
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